Reply to topic  [ 3 posts ] 
 Quinque viæ, arguments that are questionable 
Author Message
Level 17
Level 17
User avatar

Cash on hand:
71,876.00
Posts: 1791
Joined: Fri Feb 17, 2012 7:58 pm
Group: Catgirl Saviours Club
Post Quinque viæ, arguments that are questionable
So recently I got into The Divine Comedy. Wanting to find out more I wiki'd. Apparently the whole understory I've been reading is based on thomism.

Enough about that, the guy who made it made 5 laws. I'll post em down below but first a talk.

The first three are about the beginning of things, physics, and reactions in the universe. Really they're vague and just say the universe started somewhere. Also beginning is "god"

Fourth one says things are at different levels of perfection and absolute perfection exists and it's god. Also Vague and questionable

Fifth says all things "move towards an end"(motion? Idea? Flow? Fate? All of the above?) and because things act similarly in repeated experiments they're designed (or have intelligence/are intelligent) and guess who did it? God. This is vague(move towards an end?) and like the 4 isn't certain.

The first 3 are similar with the first 2 being near clones of each other. Regardless they really define the beginning and say god did it. The fourth says god is perfect and exists because perfection exists because things vary in perfection. Last one says things are designed by god as they're smart or moving because they were designed smartly.

Some people have said they only work together so I'll address that. Together they say god made everything without being made(Anyone ever think where god came from or he just is good enough?), is perfect, and made everything work because he's smart.

It's simplified and maybe a little mean if you see it sarcastically, but it's not. This is just the facts so far. (with opinion after)

Anyway looking at it these are just points of god's description. it's saying what he(Why he? God designed man in his image so I guess? Better than it) is not why he is. It explains how we can define him, but not how we know he is or more. Kinda helps on the whole belief thing.

Together they create an image, that god is a being existing before all else, causing all else, being perfect and creating objects with design to work intelligently and not randomly. It's never so much as an argument for god so much as an argument on what god is.

Separately the first three aren't really questionable as they just list god as what you call the beginning. Although the third is questionable for stating a being rather than anything else, the other two work. The fourth is definitive of god's right as an existence of perfection but does not describe how perfection can exist or would exist like the others do. The fifth defines how objects are intelligent or at least intelligently designed as they do things in the same way(moving your arm won't exit the range of it) and everything that moves has intelligence. This one's just confusing. It's vague to a large degree and states that things have to have intelligence because they move or at least be created that way. Really it says god created things because they move. The intelligence part is helped when it says like an arrow from an archer showing that things move in design, but it's questionable if it was created to work intentionally.

Separately they say each thing is called god(and some are questionable even then). Together they say these things as a whole constitute god(raising questionability by adding that all these are connected)

Overall these are separate arguments for a creator or creators that don't flow into each other without creating many more questions.

Personally I like that these exist, but they're not arguments as much as defining points and why they exist. Because of that I find it interesting but not substantial. I prefer other parts of the religion and this in itself makes no great point. It seems to make more questions than answers and proves nothing in thought. Regardless it's interesting and I wonder what you guys think of it.



The Argument of the Unmoved Mover

Prima autem et manifestior via est, quæ sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.

[The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.]

Summary

The argument of the unmoved mover, or ex motu, tries to explain that God must be the cause of motion in the universe. It is therefore a form of the cosmological argument. It goes thus:
Some things are moved.
Everything that is moving is moved by a mover.
An infinite regress of movers is impossible.
Therefore, there is an unmoved mover from whom all motion proceeds.
This mover is what we call God.

The Argument of the First Cause

Secunda via est ex ratione causæ efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causæ efficientes mediæ, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam
omnes Deum nominant.

[The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.]

Summary

The argument of the first cause (ex causa), tries, unlike the argument of the Unmoved Mover, to prove that God must have been the cause, or the creator of the universe. It is therefore another form of the cosmological argument. It goes thus:
Some things are caused.
Everything that is caused is caused by something else.
An infinite regress of causation is impossible.
Therefore, there must be an uncaused cause of all that is caused.
This causer is what we call God.

The Argument from Contingency

Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quæ talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quædam quæ sunt possibilia esse et non esse, cum quædam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quæ sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suæ necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quæ habent causam suæ necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt Deum.

[The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence – which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.]

Summary

The argument from contingency (ex contingentia):
Many things in the universe may either exist or not exist. Such things are called contingent beings.
It is impossible for everything in the universe to be contingent, for then there would be a time when nothing existed, and so nothing would exist now, since there would be nothing to bring anything into existence, which is clearly false.
Therefore, there must be a necessary being whose existence is not contingent on any other being or beings.
This being is whom we call God.

The Argument from Degree

Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis hujusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quæ sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys.[3] Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quæ sunt illius generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cujuslibet perfectionis, et hoc dicimus Deum.

[The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.[3] Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.]

Summary

The argument from degree or gradation (ex gradu). It is heavily based upon the teachings of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. It goes thus :
Varying perfections of varying degrees may be found throughout the universe.
These degrees assume the existence of an ultimate standard of perfection.
Therefore, perfection must have a pinnacle.
This pinnacle is whom we call God.

The Teleological Argument

Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quæ cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quæ non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.

[The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.]

Summary

The teleological argument or argument of "design" (ex fine), which claims that everything in the Universe has a purpose, which must have been caused by God :
All natural bodies in the world act towards ends.
These objects are in themselves unintelligent.
Acting towards an end is characteristic of intelligence.
Therefore, there exists an intelligent being that guides all natural bodies towards their ends.
This being is whom we call God.

Alternate interpretation: The teleological argument or argument of "design" (ex fine), which claims that everything in the Universe follows laws, which must have been created by God :

All natural bodies follow laws of conduct.
These objects are themselves unintelligent.
Laws of conduct are characteristic of intelligence.
Therefore, there exists an intelligent being that created the laws for all natural bodies.
This being is whom we call God.

_________________
The truth to everything lies in nothing.
Games are awesome Nuff Said.
Fuck you all, I love you so much.
Storytelling is my true love.
I Thought of all of these statements in an instant.
I improv so well not improving is like retarding myself.
BLAH BLAH BLAH Pretentious crap, references, jokes, and contrary statements.

Image


Sat Mar 10, 2012 7:44 am
Profile
Level 39
Level 39
User avatar

Cash on hand:
2,187.55

Bank:
5,250.50
Posts: 21063
Joined: Sat Feb 14, 2009 11:44 pm
Group: Sysop
Post Re: Quinque viæ, arguments that are questionable
My opinion is that if god exists, he's either a dumbfuck or a high school undergrad.

The universe isnt perfect.

_________________
Image
Yeap.

_________________
Click the icon to see the image in fullscreen mode  
1 pcs.
Click the icon to see the image in fullscreen mode  
4 pcs.


Sat Mar 10, 2012 6:57 pm
Profile E-mail WWW
Level 17
Level 17
User avatar

Cash on hand:
71,876.00
Posts: 1791
Joined: Fri Feb 17, 2012 7:58 pm
Group: Catgirl Saviours Club
Post Re: Quinque viæ, arguments that are questionable
Well it says that god is perfect, but everything else isn't. As to create perfection would create another god which in uneeded. Never really thinks about god's intentions. Does he want another god? Being all powerful, all knowing, all being does he even think or have emotions? Is he just being? By concept he's "good". So whatever he exists as is "good" all he does is "good". By creating us and giving us freedom it's "good" even if it allows us to break morals or cause problems. Random events are "good" and all of history is created from this "good". Because he created, so he is magnificent. At least what religion says. But why? No one asks that.There is no basis for it. God complex? Ego? Love? Creating TO create? No answer or even context exists.

_________________
The truth to everything lies in nothing.
Games are awesome Nuff Said.
Fuck you all, I love you so much.
Storytelling is my true love.
I Thought of all of these statements in an instant.
I improv so well not improving is like retarding myself.
BLAH BLAH BLAH Pretentious crap, references, jokes, and contrary statements.

Image


Sat Mar 10, 2012 8:44 pm
Profile
Display posts from previous:  Sort by  
Reply to topic   [ 3 posts ] 
 

Similar topics

 
Been seeing a lot of bad arguments online lately
Forum: ./General Spam
Author: n0th1n
Replies: 4
Top


Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 7 guests


You cannot post new topics in this forum
You cannot reply to topics in this forum
You cannot edit your posts in this forum
You cannot delete your posts in this forum

Search for:
Jump to:  
cron
Powered by phpBB © 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007 phpBB Group
Mods Database :: Imprint :: Crawler Feeds :: Reset blocks
Designed by STSoftware for PTF.

Portal XL 5.0 ~ Premod 0.3 phpBB SEO